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said, quoting WILUSTON, loc. cit. supra: "An express warranty is generally 
exacted for the protection of the buyer, not to limit the liability of the seller." 
Supra at 596, 35 S. E. (2d) at 805. By reliance upon, this guiding principle, 
the court has reached a proper result which may well mean that by judicial 
decision Virginia will follow the states which have adopted the Uniform Sales 
Act. 
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The Outlook for International Law. By J. L. Brierly. Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press. 1944. Pp. 142. $2.00. 
Anything that is written by Professor Brierly is worth reading. 
He is one of the keenest minds operating in the field of international 
law, and his views of the outlook for that system are therefore im- 
portant. It is rather depressing to observe that the defects of the 
existing system which he notes in Chapter I find their only relief in 
a supposed international organization which, in spite of good wishes, 
must be said to be thus far marked by regrettable failures. The 
period of two great wars it is not responsible for. A new experiment 
in international organization, the United Nations, organized since the 
book was published, is accompanied by a commitment that no action 
shall be taken by the operative Security Council except by the unani- 
mous consent of five great powers, a unanimity which has never pre- 
vailed on any important issue. They seem likely to use their veto not 
only to prevent action against themselves, and possibly even considera- 
tion of the question, but also action against their satellites and spheres 
of influence which all of them have strengthened. The organization is 
thus apparently left with the promise of action only against powers 
neutral in the late war and against ex-enemy states, Japan, Germany 
and Italy, which in part have been deprived by the Potsdam Agree- 
ment, with little reference to the limitations of law, of substantial 
hope of future life. Perhaps it was not this system which appealed 
to Professor Brierly as a promise for the future strengthening of 
international law. 
Since international organization has so little to show-except great 
armaments and great debts-the subscriber is unable to share the 
optimism of the author. The effort to convert a system of coordina- 
tion into a system of subordination has served fairly effectively to 
produce a general departure from international law in war, without 
giving us anything substantial in its place. Whether it has terminated 
the existence of international law in war or not depends greatly up- 
on future factual conditions which are unpredictable. In a valuable 
article published in the Law Quarterly Review,' Professor Brierly 
was then unable to reconcile municipal regulations of prize proce- 
dure with current international law. Having seen that law flouted 
1. Brierly, International Law in England (1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 24, 26. 
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by all the belligerents, it seems difficult to believe that a precarious 
international organization can revive respect for the institution. The 
author concedes that neutrality purports to have been abolished by 
the theory of the League of Nations, thus substituting for the old 
localization of wars the modern conception of universal war, the 
threat of which is supposed to produce peace. It is a little difficult 
to follow the reasoning of optimists in this matter. 
In the first chapter of the book Professor Brierly discusses the 
present system, pointing out its primitive character, since it depends 
on custom and must tolerate the absence of a legislature. This was 
the only method possible for a constellation of sixty sovereign and 
theoretically equal states. He notes that a large part of international 
relations is not covered by law at all. It serves mainly to delimit the 
jurisdiction of the competing states. Through the growing practice 
of arbitration much sensible dissipation of conflicts had occurred dur- 
ing the 19th century. 
Instead of admitting the necessity for excepting vital interests 
from arbitration, many advocates of the new system would subject 
even these to adjudication. But the difficulty of subjecting theoreti- 
cally sovereign states to law is only enhanced by the attempt to bring 
their political differences under legal control. The author shows in 
Chapter II the attempts that have been made to produce such a re- 
sult by distinguishing just from unjust wars, which distinction the 
League tried to revive. He portrays the conditions which developed 
neutrality and particularly promoted it to a high estate in the 19th 
century. It will be a surprise to some to observe the author's judg- 
ment that it was British policy which facilitated neutrality. Never- 
theless, neutrality is pictured as a fortuitous circumstance of 19th 
century politics. Little is said about the attack on neutrality by the 
advocates of collective security. But it is interesting to note that a 
recent writer in The Nation, Mr. A. Vallance, suggests that Eng- 
land, to preserve its life, will probably remain neutral in the wars of 
the collosi, the United States and Russia, which he professes to 
foresee. 
In Chapter III the author discusses "vital interests" as escaping not 
only arbitration, but possibly the control of an international organiza- 
tion. In fact, with its reservations, the United Nations may be an ad- 
mission of the fallacies of collective security. The Monroe Doctrine is 
properly denominated political and extra-legal. The author's dis- 
cussion of vital interests and of the differences between municipal and 
international law is a contribution. It will surprise many to learn 
that a blind endorsement of compulsory arbitration might have frus- 
trated the evolution of Europe. Arbitration might work well or ill 
depending greatly upon the issues to be determined. The difficulty 
of applying general principles and rules rather than particular treat- 
ment to international law is ably discussed, as well as the fact that 
international law is so largely political as to constitute a handicap to 
the purely legal approach. The United States had better be careful 
before it endorses the proposal of romantic advocates to accept the 
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obligatory jurisdiction inherent in Article 36 of the Statute of the 
Court of International Justice. 
Chapter IV deals with vital interests inside the state and shows 
that groups occasionally rise above the law. The author is much 
taken by the maxim that for any order organization is necessary, 
and that good laws and good arms must go together. It seems a 
pity that Machiavelli must now be called upon to justify the United 
Nations. The factors which make for community feeling in interna- 
tional life were not notably evident at Potsdam. 
In Chapter V the author points out why the League of Nations 
had to fail. He finds the failure in the lack of good arms, but it is 
submitted that some of the fault lies with the theory of enforcing 
peace, a peace much to be desired but never to be obtained by inter- 
national force, at least not so long as there are such things as sov- 
ereign states. The author wisely observes that the promise of any 
state to go to war in the future must always remain precarious, and 
yet he finds some hope in an advance arrangement embodying 
promises. The author realizes the fragility of promises. 
Chapter VI on international order discusses sanctions. Profes- 
sor Brierly does not point out, however, how badly they worked in 
1935, and that they drove Mussolini into the arms of Hitler. Here 
also the obligations undertaken are precarious. The flagrant breaches 
of neutrality which preceded this war are justified by the author 
under the rather lame excuse that the Budapest Resolutions of the 
International Law Association interpreting the Kellogg Pact justi- 
fied them. This is not law, but wishful thinking. 
In Chapter VI the author rightly places order, law and good gov- 
ernment in their appropriate hierarchy. But these virtues are not 
easy to find in Europe today. The author asks, is there a reasonable 
chance of an international order which shall abolish single states 
and spheres of influence and substitute cooperation? History would 
seem to give an answer. Actually sovereign states and spheres of in- 
fluence have never been abolished and are today stronger than ever. 
Indeed, many critics suspect that the United Nations is just an excuse 
for military alliances. Collective security may be an ideal, but it is 
likely to remain a myth as long as sovereign states prevail. The 
author has little to say about the Treaty of Versailles, and Postdam 
appeared subsequent to the book. The author is persuaded, however, 
that power to support law is necessary 2 and finds that feature in 
the prospective organization, now transformed into the United Na- 
tions. But whereas the League failed to inspire confidence, as the au- 
thor observes, the United Nations cannot be called an improvement. 
The author calls attention to the dangers of the hegemony of the great 
powers and the possibility of revolt against such domination. Yet, he 
insists that world organization is a prerequisite of international law. 
Why? It was not before 1920. He notes the difficulty of regulating 
international relations in water-tight compartments. If the League 
was a standing conference system, as he says, conferences can lead to as 
2. p. 84. 
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much disagreement as agreement. Economic considerations trans- 
cend national boundaries and warrant international regulation. 
While pointing out in Chapter VII the disadvantages of sover- 
eignty, unanimity and veto powers, he nevertheless places his hopes 
on organization and a majority system. He has excellent things to 
say on why majority rule will not cure the defects of the unanimity 
system, and that unanimity sometimes works. Public opinion is a 
weak reed on which to lean. The author supports an increased in- 
tervention in the affairs of individual governments. But this promise 
may prove more belligerent than peaceful, and posits a new type of 
international society. 
In the last chapter, entitled "International Disputes," the author 
deals with the defects in compulsory arbitration and shows why 
municipal law furnishes no analogy to international law. He also 
affirms that not all disputes are capable of submission to a court. 
His discussion of the defects of peaceful change and the revision of 
treaties is enlightening. He thinks that the conflict of interests will 
handicap peaceful change. But he nevertheless insists on the value 
of security, which may not be susceptible of guaranty. Peaceful 
change, he says, is hardly possible without the consent of the victim, 
especially when the latter is a strong state or has strong friends. 
Hence, the difficulties of Article 19 of the Covenant. 
On the whole, the book is provocative of much thought and de- 
serves earnest consideration. It will make men aware of the possible 
insolubility by mechanical means of some of the present problems, 
and of the difficulties of obtaining what the author calls collective 
security. 
Edein Borchard. 
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The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study. Volume I. 
By Ernst Rabel. Foreword by William Draper Lewis, Direc- 
tor, American Law Institute, and Hessel Yntema, Editor, 
Michigan Legal Studies.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 1945. Pp. lvi, 745. $12.50. 
Rabel's new book, one of the Michigan Legal Studies, is impres- 
sive evidence of its author's learning and ability. This first volume 
contains the introductory material for a complete treatise on the 
Conflict of Laws and a discussion of the rules applicable to family 
law. It raises great hope that the projected volumes will soon be 
completed and published. If the work lacks any useful element, it is 
that Rabel has not allowed himself sufficient space for his own critical 
appraisals and recommendations for the future. It is fortunate, how- 
ever, that he felt that it was his "duty not entirely to conceal his im- 
pressions regarding the desirable path that evolution may take." 
Rabel's demonstrated knowledge of civil and common law rules, 
theories and techniques makes it difficult to think of a writer more 
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